The Origins of the Crimean War by David M. Goldfrank

Author:David M. Goldfrank
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Publisher: Routledge

The Tsar, true to form, paid serious attention only to the military side of affairs. As early as 20 April he served notice to Francis Joseph that without the desired guarantee from Turkey Russia would resort to arms. On 28 May Nicholas received Menshikov’s final reports from ‘the fatal courier’ and met with Nesselrode, Seniavin, War Minister Dolgorukov and the ever present Minister of the Court, Adlerberg. By the next day the Tsar had resolved upon a three-stage plan: (1) to give the Porte another chance to accept the ‘Treaty’ or immediately occupy the Principalities; (2) in the event of the Turks refusing to accept, to block the Bosphorous and maybe recognize the independence of the Principalities; (3) if the Turks continue to be stubborn, then either Austria occupies Serbia and Herzegovina or Russia proclaims them and the Principalities independent too. This plan envisioned requesting at least Francis Joseph’s moral support and offering him chunks of the Western Balkans and reciprocity in the protection of Catholics and Orthodox in the other’s sphere of influence.11 Nicholas assumed French opposition and Austrian compliance, and only worried that London might not repudiate Stratford, when the truth (according to Menshikov’s reports) was known. In that case: ‘it would be the greatest breach of faith. But even this would not stop me. I shall march along my own path on the strength of my convictions, as Russia’s dignity demands.’12

The immediate task now was to set into motion the logical sequel to Menshikov’s departure, a final ultimatum from St Petersburg itself to Constantinople. This took the form of a letter from Nesselrode to Reshid, which announced a forthcoming occupation of the Principalities – as a material pledge, but not an act of war – if the Porte did not accept Menshikov’s final draft note within eight days of receipt of the letter.13

Nesselrode, well aware that with British backing the Turks might choose to fight rather than to submit, and certain that Stratford held the key cards, played at enlisting Seymour’s aid in the interest of peace by having him request an interview with the Tsar to delay the marching orders. The latter may have felt that by letting the partition initiatives drop, by retreating from the original draft sened to Menshikov’s final note, and by postponing a declaration of war and an attack on the Bosphorus, he had taken British sensitivities sufficiently into account. Nicholas certainly acted as if these measures should have sufficed. In his meeting with Seymour on 30 May, however, Nicholas stonewalled, evaded and bluffed. He attacked Stratford’s conduct and alleged breach of instructions, but dared not formally ask London to account for his behaviour. The Tsar referred to rights granted by Kuchuk-Kainarji, but would not be pinned down over chapter and verse. He brushed off Seymour’s warnings that only Stratford’s reports would carry weight in London and that an irresolute government there would fall. As for a delay, the Tsar retorted that London had received enough reports of his conversations to know his thinking, as if to say that he would not allow the British to deflect his orders.

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